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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
CHESSON V. MONTGOMERY MUT. INS. CO.: EXPERT 
TESTIMONY BASED ON NOVEL SCIENTIFIC 
METHODOLOGY FAILED TO MEET THE FRYE-REED 
THRESHOLD FOR GENERAL ACCEPTANCE BECAUSE OF 
A FUNDAMENTAL DIVERGENCE OF OPINION IN THE 
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE 
METHODOLOGY AND FLAWS IN THE UNDERLYING 
ANALYSIS. 
By: Brett H. Philpotts 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an expert's theory based on a 
novel scientific methodology, which was not generally accepted in the 
relevant scientific community, failed the Frye-Reed standard. Chesson v. 
Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 434 Md. 346, 75 A.3d 932 (2013). Finding 
continued controversy within the scientific field regarding the basis of the 
expert witness's theories, as well as flaws in his underlying analysis, the 
court deemed the expert's methodology too unreliable to be admitted as 
testimonial evidence. Id. at 380, 75 A.3d at 951. 
On November 18, 2002, employees of the Baltimore Washington 
Conference of the United Methodist Church noticed a foul odor coming from 
the walls of their office building. Maintenance workers breached an interior 
wall and discovered Aspergillus and Stachybotrys mold. After allegedly 
developing non-respiratory symptoms such as memory loss, muscle aches, 
and joint pain, the employees sought the care and treatment of physician Dr. 
Ritchie Shoemaker. 
To connect the symptoms exhibited by the employees to the discovered 
mold exposure, Dr. Shoemaker applied a novel technique he developed 
called "Repetitive Exposure Protocol." The first stage of the technique 
included identifying the presence of mold by sight, smell, or lab testing. 
Using a differential diagnosis, or process of elimination, the doctor ruled out 
alternative possible causes of the symptoms by physical examination of the 
patient, and the patients were treated by an off-label use of Cholestyramine 
to alleviate symptoms. The second stage of the technique involved 
diagnostic testing of the patients for biological markers, such as hormone 
response, immune response, and visual contrast sensitivity. Based upon this 
methodology, Dr. Shoemaker reached a diagnosis that ruled out alternative 
causes in order to establish workplace mold exposure as the direct cause of a 
patients' non-respiratory symptoms. 
The employees each filed a claim with the Maryland Worker's 
Compensation Commission, alleging he or she had sustained "sick building 
syndrome" due to mold exposure. The commission denied two employees' 
claims, but awarded partial compensation to the remaining employees upon 
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finding that they had sustained accidental injury or occupational disease. 
The Circuit Court for Howard County granted the employees' petitions for 
review and consolidated their claims, denied Montgomery Mutual's request 
to exclude Dr. Shoemaker's testimony, and declined to hold a Frye-Reed 
hearing on Dr. Shoemaker's methodology. The jury found in favor of the 
employees, which Montgomery Mutual appealed. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's admission of Dr. Shoemaker's 
testimony again without holding a Frye-Reed hearing. Granting certiorari, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland remanded to the circuit court to hold a 
Frye-Reed hearing, directing the lower court to consider whether Dr. 
Shoemaker's methodology was generally accepted in the relevant scientific 
community. 
Finding Dr. Shoemaker's protocols sufficiently reliable, properly 
performed, and generally accepted, the circuit court allowed Dr. 
Shoemaker's methodology to prove causation for the employees' illnesses. 
Montgomery Mutual once again appealed, but this time the intermediate 
appellate court reversed, finding continued controversy in the scientific 
community and a lack of general acceptance for Dr. Shoemaker's 
methodology. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to 
determine whether the intermediate appellate court erred in finding Dr. 
Shoemaker's expert testimony inadmissible. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by clarifying the 
purpose and importance of the Frye-Reed general acceptance test. Chesson, 
434 Md. at 351, 75 A.3d at 934. A novel scientific technique must be 
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs." !d. at 351, 75 A.3d at 934-35 (quoting Reed v. 
State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.3d 364, 372 (1978) (internal citations 
omitted)). In situations where general acceptance in the scientific 
community was not so broadly established as to be taken by judicial notice, 
the court would consider testimonial evidence, journals from the legal and 
relevant scientific communities, and publications from other reliable sources 
when determining the degree of acceptance by experts in the relevant field. 
Chesson, 434 Md. at 356, 75 A.3d at 937. Although general acceptance does 
not require universal adoption, the presence of a divergence of opinion or a 
fundamental controversy necessitates the exclusion of such testimony. Id. at 
356-57, 75 A.3d at 937-38 (citing U.S. Gypsum v. Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 
183,647 A.2d 405,424 (1994)). 
Acknowledging that Dr. Shoemaker's methods were not so broadly 
established as to be taken by judicial notice, the court began by evaluating 
the degree of acceptance of Dr. Shoemaker's work within the relevant 
scientific community. Chesson, 434 Md. at 373, 75 A.3d at 947. The court 
evaluated the expert testimony and scientific literature proffered by both 
parties and determined that Dr. Shoemaker's methodology was controversial 
and not generally accepted within the relevant scientific field. Id. at 373-79, 
75 A.3d at 947-51. Perhaps most damaging, in light of the fact that the 
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causes of action arose in 2002, Dr. Shoemaker acknowledged in a co-
authored 2005 paper that his causal theory linking mold exposure to non-
respiratory symptoms was controversial and not generally accepted. Id. at 
373, 75 A.3d at 947. The argument that Dr. Shoemaker's theories and 
methods had later become generally accepted because scientific articles from 
2007 discussed the lack of consensus about whether mold exposure could 
cause non-respiratory or non-allergic symptoms did not persuade the court. 
Id. at 377-79, 75 A.3d at 950-51. Accordingly, the court found that Dr. 
Shoemaker's theories on causation and methods of diagnosis remained 
controversial and not generally accepted in the relevant scientific field. ld. 
Further, the court noted that other jurisdictions had found Dr. 
Shoemaker's testimony inadmissible. Chesson, 434 Md. at 379-80, 75 A.3d 
at 951 (citing Young v. Burton, 567 F. Supp. 2d 121, 130-31 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
The District of Columbia, Virginia, Florida, and Alabama had all rejected Dr. 
Shoemaker's theories regarding mold illnesses, and ultimately found his 
expert testimony inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), because his 
"Repetitive Exposure Protocol" was unreliable. Chesson, 434 Md. at 379-
80, 75 A.3d at 951 (citing Young, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 131). 
Finally, the court considered the requirement of the exclusion of expert 
testimony where the underlying methodology contains flaws, regardless of 
whether the testimony is based on broadly established or novel scientific 
methodology. Chesson, 434 Md. at 357, 75 A.3d at 938. Here, the court 
highlighted a fundamental flaw in Dr. Shoemaker's methodology concerning 
his failure to account for the level of mold exposure sustained by patients 
enrolled in his protocol. Id. at 373, 75 A.3d at 947. Two scientific articles 
stated that mold concentration must be measured in order to establish 
causality of illness, but Dr. Shoemaker had neglected to measure the 
concentration of mold in the affected building. Id. at 373-75, 75 A.3d at 
947-49. As a result, Dr. Shoemaker's failure to account for levels of mold 
exposure constituted an "analytical gap" fatal to the admissibility of his 
testimony. Id. at 380, 75 A.3d at 951. After finding his testimony to be 
based on flawed methodology and his theories to lack general acceptance in 
the scientific community, the court ultimately found Dr. Shoemaker's 
testimony inadmissible because it failed to meet Frye-Reed's validity and 
reliability requirements. Id. 
In Chesson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reinforced the rigorous 
Frye-Reed standard for determining the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony. Considering the expense in litigating a Frye-Reed proceeding and 
in producing experts for hearings, Maryland practitioners should take 
appropriate steps to vet the testimony of expert witnesses and confirm the 
general acceptance of novel theories and methods. 
